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Robber Barons Redux: Antirnonopoly 
Reconsidered 
RICHARD R. JOHN 
The antimonopoly critique or big business that flourished in the 
United States during the 1880s is a neglected chapter in the 
history of American reform,. In this essay, a revised version of 
Richard .R. John's 2011 Business History Conference presidential 
address,· John shows how this critique found expression in a 
gallery of influential cartoons that ran in the New York City-based 
satirical magazines Puck and Judge. Among the topics that the 
cartoonists featured was the manipulation of the nation's financial 
markets by financier Jay Gould. 
It has long been an article of faith among business historians that one 
must not, even in jest, dignify the nineteenth·century indictment of 
American business leaders as robber barons. This stricture was firmly 
impressed on me in 1981, when, as a first· year graduate student in the 
history of American civilization, I began to prepa±e for my PhD oral 
exam in business history with Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., then, asnow, a 
towering figure in the field. It made little sense, in Chandler's view, to 
debate whether oil magnate John D. Rockefeller was a robber baron 
or an industrial statesman, as a collection of essays intended for 
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undergraduates had proposed in 1949.1 "What could be less likely 
to produce useful generalizations"-Chandler wrote in 1984, in 
articulating a position he had held for many years-"than a debate 
over vaguely defined moral issues based on unexamined ideological 
assumptions and. presuppositions?"2 
Chandlerian business history relegated the robber baron to the 
dustbin of history. And there he has mostly remained, at least for 
business historians. With few exceptions, the collective portrait of the 
late-nineteenth-century business leader that has emerged from the 
scholarship of business historians in the past several decades has 
sidestepped the once heated debate that swirled around his conduct 
and character. 3 \/Vhen he was not reimagined as a Chandlerian 
organization builder-as, for example, in Maury Klein's Life and 
Legend of fay Gould (1986), Olivier Zunz's Making America Corporate 
(1990), and Steven W. Usselman's Regulating Railroad Innovation 
(2002)-he became the beneficiary of a particular set of institutional 
arrangements-as, for example, in Naomi R. Lamoreaux's Great 
Merger Movement in American Business (1985), Richard Franklin 
Bensel's Political Economy of American Industrialization (2000), and 
Colleen A. Dunlavy's essays on the late-nineteenth century 
"plutocracy" (2004, 2007).4 Each of these approaches has much to 
1. Latham, Rockefeller. The robber bar.QII epithet wastliscussed thoughtfully in 
a number of essays in the 1950s (e.g., Bridges, "Robber Baron Concept"), 
culminating in a morally engaged survey of the debate by David Chalmers in 1961 
(Chalmers, "Robber Barons"). Since 1961, however, little of consequence has been 
published on this topic, a tribute to the growing influence of the Chandlerian 
approach to business history. For the most part, the topic has been relegated to the 
realm of polemic-for example, Folsom, The Myth of the Robber Barons. The 
antimouopoly critique, in contrast, has received a thoughtful discussion in two 
recent publications: T. J. Stiles's Pulitzer-prize-winning biography of Cornelius 
Vanderbilt, The First _Tycoon, and Richard White's remarkable history of the first 
transcontinentals; Railroaded. 
2. Chandler, "Comparative Business History," 7, Chandler's rejection of the 
robber baron-industrial statesman duality was in one sense disingenuous, since, in 
the main, he endorsed the business-leade~as-industrial-statesman thesis that had 
been popularized by Columbia University historian Allan Nevins, albeit without 
its overtly moral connotations. Moral considerations, however, Were rarely far 
from view. For Chandler, as for Nevins, big business built the economic juggernaut 
that enabled the Allies to vanquish the Nazis in the Second World War, an outcome 
that for Chandler, as for Nevins, was a moral triumph of incalculable significance. 
I am grateful to Noam Maggor for helping me to clarify my thinking on this point. 
3. Labor historians, in contrast, have never entirely abandoned the moral 
critique. See, for example, Licht, Industrializing America, chap. 6. 
4. Klein, Gould; Zunz, Making America Corporate; Usselman, Regulating 
Railroad Innovation; Lamoreaux, Great Merger Movement; Bensel, Political 
Economy; Dunlavy, "Citizens to Plutocrats"; Dunlavy and Welskopp, "Peculiarities 
and Myths." 
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recommend it. Yet neither call fully explain the antimonopoly critique 
of business behavior out of which the robber baron evolved. This 
essay reconsiders the antimonopoly critique by locating the robber 
baron in his cultllral and institutional context. It is not my intention 
to reopen the hoary debate over robber barons and industrial 
statesmen: to read this essay in this way misconstrues its intent. 
Rather, it is my goal to historicize this debate by explaining how it 
emerged and why it mattered. 
The robber baron epithet was neither invented nor popularized in 
the western Unit8d States, as historians h~ve lo(Ilg assumed, echoing 
a conceit championed by cultural critic Matthew Josephson. And its 
lineage was neither plebian nor rural. Rather, it originated along the 
Atlantic seaboard, in a decidedly patrician, urban milieu. Writing in 
1954, Josephson reminisced that he drew the title for his 1934 expose, 
The Robber Barons, from "the folklore of the Kansas Greenbackers 
and Populists of the 1880s."5 In the 1962 fo:ireword to the Robber 
Barons, Josephson.:vvas even more specific. "It was not I," Josephson 
declared, "but the embattled farmers of Kansas, who is one of their 
antimonopoly pamphlets of 1880, first applied the nomenclature of 
Robber Barons to th~ masters of railway systems."6 In this, as in many 
matters large and small, Josephson misled his readers. In fact, a 
variant of the robber baron epithet can be found as early as 1859 in an 
editorial penned by newspaper editor Remy Raymond for the staid 
New York Times. Raymond's target was business magnate Cornelius 
Vanderbilt; Vanderbilt's business practices, in Raymond's opinion, 
were reminiscent of those of the "old German barons" on the Rhine. 7 
The characterization of certain business leaders as robber barons 
emerged shortly thereafter. The epithet was coined not by pitchfork 
wielding populists, as Josephson mistakenly claimed, but, rather, by 
the scions of two of the oldest and most socially respectable families 
in the country. Its earliest known occurrence in a business context 
can be found in an 1869 letter from the perceptive business analyst 
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., to the iconoclastic political economist 
David A. Wells.8 Four years later, Adams's cousin and neighbor, 
Josiah Quincy, Jr., invoked the epithet in a popular address. The 
business practice Quincy oondemned was the inflation of dividend 
5. Cited in Bridges, "Robber Baron Concept," 2. 
6. Josephson, Robber Barons, vi. 
7. Stiles, First Tycoon, 328-9. Ironically, Raymond invoked this metaphor to 
castigate certain practices of Vanderbilt's that were, in the main, antimonopolistic. 
8. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., to David A. Wells, 14 January 1869, in Dorfman, 
Econ;mic Mind, 23. "The old robber barons were children in the art of thieving-it 
is only now reduced to a system; poor old Rob Roy must hide his diminished head 
before Drew, or Vanderbilt, or Jay Gould." 
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payments on railroad securities occasioned by the unwarranted 
increase of the railroad's capitalization, a technique known as stock 
watering. "The robber barons of the middle ages," Quincy sputtered, 
"took toll from everybody tbat passed, but tbey had not wit enough at 
that time to devise a plan by which tbey could make the whole 
community pay interest forever upon the money tbey had stolen. "9 
Adams and Quincy had much in common. Each had extensive 
business experience, each hailed from a respected family with a long 
heritage of public service, and each was college educated, a 
circumstance that helped explain tbeir familiarity witb an otherwise 
obscure chapter in medieval German history. No less significantly, 
each was descended from one of tbe founders of tbe republic, a 
circumstance that invested their pronouncements with considerable 
moral authority and that assured tbem a wide and respectful audience. 
Adams was tbe great grandson of John Adams, a drafter of the 
Declaration of Independence and the second president of tbe United 
States. Few Americans had a more impressive pedigree: in addition 
to being the direct descendent of a founding father, Adams was also 
the son of the US minister to the United Kingdom during the Civil 
War and tbe grandson of the sixth US president, John Adams's son, 
John Quincy. Shortly after penning, his "robber baron" letter to Wells, 
Adams published Chapters of Erie: And Other Essays (1871), a 
slashing indictment of the financial jugglery of railroad baron Jay 
Gould. Justly admired in its own day, Adams's indictment remains, 
more than a century later, a landmark in American investigative 
journalism. In 1872, Adams accepted an appointment as chairman of 
the MassachusEftls Railroad Commission, the first regulatory agency 
of its kind in the United States.10 
Quincy was the grandson of a prominent Boston, Massachusetts, 
lawyer who, in the 1770s had vigorously defended tbe colony's rights 
in its contest with Great Britain before succumbing to tuberculosis at 
age 31 in April 1775, one week after the War of Independence had 
begun at Lex.ington and Concord. Had Quincy's grandfather lived, he 
would almost certainly have played a prominent role in tbe founding 
of the republic. (Quincy's grandfather was, somewhat confusingly, 
also known as Josiali Quincy, Jr., making his grandson, technically, 
Josiali Quincy N.) Quincy's father was even more distinguished. 
Following a stint in Congress (1805-1813) and a term as Boston mayor 
(1823-1828), he was appointed president. of Harvard College, a 
posiUon he held between 1829 and 1845. Quincy, Sr., is probably best 
known today for his pivotal role in the establishment of the warehouse 
9. New York Times, May 8, 1873. 
10. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, chap. 1. 
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complex in downtown Boston that in the 1970s was transformed into 
the tourist mecca named in his honor Quincy Market. Quincy, Jr.-
who, like his father and grandfather, was a lawyer hy training-also 
served a term as Boston mayor (1845-1849) and was for many years 
the treasurer of the most important railroad in Massachusetts. 
Quincy's business career came to an abrupt end in 1852, when, as a 
result of the financial collapse of a Vermont railroad in which he had 
invested, he lost much of his inheritance and found himself obliged 
to return to his legal practice.11 
The medieval robber barons were renegade warlords who had 
defied the Holy Roman Emperor by illegally collecting exorbitant 
tolls on river-borne traffic, sometimes, it was alleged, by stretching 
iron chains across the Rhine to block the passage of vessels unwilling 
to pay the tax. Their heirs, in the minds of Adams and Quincy, were 
many of the country's railroad leaders. Though Adams and Quincy 
would at various points in their careers each make large investments 
in railroad corporations, their conception of business enterprise was 
shaped by what, in retrospect, one might call a pro-producerist or 
even an anti-investor bias.12 Like their medieval forebears, the modern 
robber barons blocked comm~rce and flaunted the law in order to 
extort exorbitant sums from the merchants, manufacturers, and 
farmers who shipped their goods through the transportation channels 
they controlled. The source of their wealth was not the legitimate 
service they provided, but, rather, the exorbitant fees that their 
investor-owners charged shippers to cever the cost of the dividend 
payments on the overvalued railroad securities in which they had 
invested. 
The antimonopoly critique had deep roots in American public life. 
Older than the republic, it drew its emotional power from the 
principled assault on special privilege popularized by the Scottish 
Enlightenment political economist Adam Smith, an indictment that 
remained a pillar of moral philosophy in the United States during the 
early republic. Antimonopolists had no doctrinaire objection to 
organizational giantism, as business historians have long mistakenly 
11. Kirkland, Men, Cities, and Transportation, 1, 177. 
12. The phrase "anti-investor bias" is easily misunderstood. The investors that 
Adams condemned were speculators intent on manipulating the levers of power to 
make a quick profit. Adams had little quarrel with the coupon-clipping rentiers 
{the proverbial- "widows and orphans") who relied on financial securities for a 
steady return. The conflation of speculators with rentiers has caused confusion, 
and not only among historians. Nineteenth-century contemporaries also sometimes 
overlooked this distinction, a propensity that was encouraged by speculators like 




assumed. Giant orgauizations had existed since the early republic, 
aud many Americaus regarded them as a fulfillment of the promise of 
the revolution. Utopian socialism, it is worth recalling, was invented 
in the first half of the nineteenth century not in the factories ofEurope, 
but, rather in the communitarian projects that briefly flourished in the 
American Middle West. In principle, antimonopo!ists had no 
objection to the vast aggregations of power and authority that business 
historians call "big business": in fact, they often complained that 
railroad and telegraph corporations were unnaturally small. Yet they 
remained fiercely opposed to the manipulation of the political process 
for economic gain and held fast to the time-honored presumption that 
the citizenry had an oHigation to hold the powerful accountable for 
their conduct and performance. 
Antimonopolists could be found all across the political spectrum. 
Their ranks included not only well-born patricians like Adams and 
Quincy but also the doctrinaire libertarian journalist William Leggett 
'(1801-1839), the maverick telegraph promoter Henry O'Rielly (1806-
1886), and the crusading land reformer Henry George (1839-1897). 
Among the most influential were the prominent New York City-based 
wholesalers who, in 1881, esh1blished the "Anti Monopoly League," 
an organization that would exert a not~inconsiderable influence on 
the 1884 presidential election. Democratic presidential contender 
Grover Cleveland could plausibly run as an antimonopolist; his 
Republican rival, James G. Blaine, could no~. Antimonopoly also 
proved congenial to many of the leaders of the Populist Party that 
flourished in the 1890s throughout the West and South. Like Adams 
and Quincy, the Populists derided big business not because 
corporations were too large, but, rather, because they failed to 
maintain the low rates and high performances standards that, had 
they been operated for the benefit of the public and not their investors, 
they could have easily provided. 13 
The intellectual affinities between eastern and western 
antimonopolists have been obscured not only by their cultural and 
political differences but also by Adams's pointed dismissal of mid-
western railroad legislation as nalve and counterproductive. 14 While 
substantial, these differences are easily exaggerated. Like the Populists, 
Adams and Quincy lauded the organizational capabilities of the railroad 
and telegraph while deriding their operation by opportunistic speculators 
like Gould; like the Populists, they questioned the efficacy of carµ petition 
13. Postel, Populist Vision, chap. 5. 
14. Charles F. Adams, Jr., "The Railroad Usury Law," Nation 32 (April 14, 
1881), 254; Adams, "Thurber versus Fink," Nation 32 (April 21, 1881), 273-4; 
Kirkland, Charles Francis Adams, fr., 55-6. 
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as a counterweight to monopoly; and, like the Populists, they looked 
to the government to check speculative excess. 
While the origins of the robber baron epithet were literary, its most 
compelling expression was visual, a circumstance that has obscured 
its significance, since .most historians typically neglect images in 
favor of words. Its locus classicus was the remarkable gallery of 
satirical cartoons published during the 1880s in the influential New 
York City-based weekly satirical magazines, Puck and Judge. 15 Each 
of these magazines was managed in this period by a cartoonist-
Joseph Keppler at Puck, James A. Wales at Judge-and each was known 
primarily for the three original full-page cartoons that appeared every 
week: one on the front cover, one on the back cover, and one two-page 
spread in the centerfold. 16 In the 1880s, the decade in which the 
robber baron became firmly enshrined in American visual culture, 
Puck and Judge ran dozens of cartoons savaging Jay Gould, William 
H. Vanderbilt (Cornelius's son), and other like-minded business 
leaders as reckless monopolists unmindful of the public good. 
Cartoons are an underutilized soUice for the historian. This is 
unfortunate, since they typically conveyed their message with 
economy and vigor, making them highly effective in shaping public 
opinion and advanc;ing public debate. In addition, their imagery was 
often vivid and compelling, making them a well-spring for a visual 
iconography that can endure for generations. 17 . The business-related 
cartoons that ran in Puck and Judge during the 1880s did much to 
popularize the antimonopoly critique of special privilege while 
establishing a visual iconography that would long inform the popular 
conception of big business in the United States. 
The role of Puck and Judge in late-nineteenth-century American 
public life was roughly analogous to that of the British comic magazin~ 
15. Of the several late-nineteenth-centmy publications other than Puck and 
Judge that featured antimonopoly cartoons, the most important were the New York 
Daily Graphic and Wasp. Each was a pioneer. The Daily Graphic had run numerous 
black-and-white line drawings on business topics ever since its founding in 1873, 
while Wasp was the first American magazine to print cartoons in full color. Neither 
publication, however, could match the cultmal influence of Puck and Judge. The 
heyday of the Daily Graphic in the 1870s antedated the emergence of antimonopoly 
as a national political issue, while Wasp was published in San Francisco, far from 
the nation's leading publishing centers. 
Several full-color galleries of Puck and Judge cartoons on business topics, 
including antimonopoly, can be found on the web. See, for example, Cox, "Knovm 
Lithographic Caricatures"; National Humanities Center, "Image of the Octopus"; 
and Aldrich, "Railroad Cartoons." 
16. Wales worked as cartoonist for Puck before decamping to found Judge in 
late 1881; he drew antimonopoly cartoons for both magazines. 
17. Kemnitz, "The Cartoon as a Historical Source," 84~5. See also Culbertson, 
"Golden Age of American Political C_artoons" and Thomas, "Cartoons." 
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Punch, on which they were modeled and can be compared to that of 
the present-day television comedy programs "The Colbert Report" and 
"The Daily Show with Jon Stewart." The circulation of Puck in the 
1880s hovered arouud 80,000, with Judge not far behind.18 In the 1884 
presidential campaign, as well as the several that followed, Puck and 
Judge exerted, in the words of one well-informed contemporary, an 
influence on the "politics of the country" that was "probably greater 
than that of all the daily press combined": "Their weekly cartoons were 
awaited eagerly, were passed from hand to hand, and were the subject 
of animated comment in all political circles."19 The political salience 
of Puck and Judge was at its peak in the ruu-up to the 1884 presidential 
election, a contest in which the New York City vote was critical and the 
two political parties were closely matched. In fact, it has long been 
plausibly contended that the election outcome in New York state, and, 
therefore, the nation, had been determined by a gallery of pointed Puck 
cartoons ridiculing the Republican presidential contender James G. 
Blaine as a "tattooed man" with a morally dubious past. 20 
Puck and Judge cartoons combined pointed social commentary 
with a recent technical advance known as chromolithography. 
Chromolithography made it possible to reproduce multicolor images 
rapidly and in large.numbers. Puck and Judge were two of the first 
magazines in the country to publish in color as well as black and 
white, a distinction that set them apart from their peers and gave 
them much of their cultural cachet. Puck ran its first chromolithographic 
cartoons in 1879; Judge beginning with its first issue in 1881.21 To this 
day, cartoons that originated in Puck and Judge enliven US history 
textbooks, undergraduate lectures, and the occasional academic 
monograph, including, for example, Louis Galambos's Public Image 
of Big Business in America (1975), which featured on its front cover-
unfortunately in black and white, rather than color-an 1890 Puck 
cartoon depicting a grasping "King Monopoly."22 
Cultural historians have begun to explore the treatment by Puck 
and Judge cartoonists of certain cultural and political themes, 
including popular politics and anti-Catholicism. 23 The cartoonists' 
antimonopoly critique of American business, however, has gone 
largely umemarked. This is unfortunate, since this critique provides 
18. Hess and Northrup, Drawn and Quartered, 60. The political influence of 
Puck and fudge during the final two decades of the nineteenth century, Hess and 
Northrup concluded, would be "hard to oVerestimate," 65. 
19. Bishop, Our Political Drama, 156. 
20. Dewey, Art of Ill Will, 35, 
21. Mott, History of American Magazines 3, 522. 
22. Louis Dalrymple, "And He Asks for More!" Puck 27 ·{May 7, 1890): 
centerfold. 
23. Thomas, "Mugwump Cartoonists, the Papacy, and Tammany Hall.'~ 
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a generally well-informed and often quite revealing glimpse at a 
constellation of business practices that troubled the well-educated, 
commercially oriented, urban audience for which they were intended. 
For the cartoonists of Puck and Judge, antimonopoly was an 
obsession. Two visually arresting cartoons from Puck illustrate how 
this theme was portrayed. The first, from 1882-"0ur Robber Barons" 
-cast several of the cc_:>untry's~ wealthiest business leaders as 
medieval "robber barons" (figure 1). Prominent among them were Gould 
and Vanderbilt, businessmen whose identities would have been instantly 
recognizable to readers familiar with the visual iconography that had 
been featmed for several years in the New York Daily Graphic. The robber 
barons' victim was identified merely as the "taxpayer," a kind-of everyman 
waylaid by Gould, Vanderbilt, and their co-conspirators to fill their 
coffers. The taxes the cartoonist referred to had been levied not by the 
government, but, rather, by the corporations Gould aud Vauderbilt 
controlled: and, in particular, by the hefty fees ·their corporations charged 
their customers to transport information, people, and goods. The robber 
barons' stronghold was "Castle Monopoly," which they defended not by 
outmanaging their riv,als, but, rather, by obtaining morally dubious 
political favors, which were symbolized by the ascending set of steps 
leading up to their str9nghold that the cartoonist labeled "lobbyism," 
"friendly judges," and "land grants," the modern equivalent of the iron 
chain that the medieval robber barons had stretched across the Rhine to 
block the channel of trade. 24 
The second cartoon, also from 1882, portrayed railroad magnate 
William H. Vanderbilt rebuffing his critic~ by bluntly proclaiming 
"the public be damned" (figure 2). Vanderbilt's victim was the 
American people, rendered by Puck cartoonist Frederick B. Opper as 
an American eagle, upon which Vanderbilt had stomped his foot. 
Powerless to intervene were Vanderbilt's watchdogs-"Congress" 
and the "legislature" -whom he kept o.n a very tight leash. The 
amorality of Vanderbilt's business creed was clarified by the 
statement9 inscribed on the three plaques mounted on the wall: ::1 
don't'\ake any stock in thiB silly nonsense about v;orking for anybody's 
good but Our own"; "When we make a move it is because !t is our 
interest to do so"; and, more cryptically, "I always find the Anti-_ 
Monopolists come the cheapest."25 The third statement underscoretf 
24. T. Bernhard Gillam, "Our Robber Barons," Puck 11 Gune 14, 1882): 
centerfold. 
25. Frederick B. Opper, "'The Public be Damned!'" Puck 12 (October 18, 
1882): front cover. A similar cartoon was featured shortly thereafter in Judge, in 
which Vanderbilt declared, even more provocatively, "the poor be d ___ d": 
James A. Wales, "The Monopolists' Thanksgiving," Judge 3 (December 2, 1882): 
front cover. 
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Figure 1 "Our Robber Barons" as portrayed by a Puck cartoonist in 1882. Note 
the iron chain in the middle background impeding the channels of trade. 
According to legend, medieval German \;Varlords blocked merchants unwilling 
to pay their extortionate tolls from passing up and down the Rhine. T. Bernhard 
Gillam, 110ur Robber Barons," Puck 11 Uune 14, 1882): centerfold. 
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Figure 2 Railroad leader William H. Vanderbilt was a favorite target of Puck 
cartoonists in the 1880s. Here he was portrayed as an overstuffed millionaire 
openly contemptuous of the many critics who insisted that business leaders 
had an obligation to promote the public good. Frederick B. Opper, '"The Public 
Be Damned!"' Puck 12 (October 18, 1882): front cover. 
Opper's awareness of the often opportunl~tic cast of the antimonopoly 
critique, a critique sometimes brandished by venal members of New 
York City's Democratic political machine Tammany Hall to broaden 
their constituency and shake down politically vulnerable 
corpor!'l-tions. 
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Puck and fudge occasionally depicted giant organizations as 
predatory creatures stalking their prey. Telegraph network provider 
Western Union and telephone holding company American Bell became 
spiders and John D. Rockfeller's oil refining business a monstrous 
octopus, a characterization that, in fudge, dated back to 1884.26 Yet 
organizational giantism was not the cartoonists' primary concern. 
Almost without exception, they were troubled less by the scale of the 
organizations that theJl~skewered than by their owners' dubious 
business practices and lack of accountability. The United States had by 
1880 boasted giant organizations for almost one-hundred years, of 
which at least one--namely, the Erie Railroad-had been depicted on 
an organization chart as a fecund, and decidedly urunenacing, 
flowering tree as early as 1854.27 In fact, one of the most persistent 
complaints about Western Union and American Bell was not that they 
were unnaturally large, but, rather, that they were artificially small, 
and, thus, incapable ofrealizing their technical potential." 
The antimonopoly critique of American business in the 1880s 
focused primarily on three sectors: transportation, communications, 
and energy. This essay focuses on communications, a topic that has 
been relatively neglected. And in particular, it takes as its theme the 
journalistic assault on telegraph giant Western Union and telephone 
giant American Bell. i 
The takeover of Western Union by financier Jay Gould in January 
1881 transformed public attitudes to"'.ard antimonopoly in the 
telegraph business. Prior to Gould's takeover, many if not most of 
Western Union's critics regarded antimonopoly legislation as an 
effective regulatory tool. It was by no means a foolish conclusion: 
After all, the country's two most important telegraph laws-namely, 
the New York Telegraph Act of 1848 and the National Telegraph Act of 
26. Frederick B. Opper, "Justice in the Web," Puck 17 (July 22, 1885]: front 
cover; Grant E. Hamilton, "In the Clutch of a Grasping Monopoly," Judge 14 (April 
7, 1888): back cover; Frank Beard, "The Monster Monopoly," fudge 6 Uuly 19, 
1884): back cover. 
27. "New York and Ede Railroad Diagram Representing a Plan of Organization" 
(1855), Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
This remarkable image, the oldest known organizational chart of a major American 
corporation-a document that Chandler searched for but never located-is 
reproduced and analyzed in Wrege and Sorbo, "A Bridge Builder Changes a 
Railroad," 183-218. 
28. For a related discussion, see Lipartito, "Utopian Corporation." The 
propensity of nineteenth-century Americans to invest such enormous expectations 
in giant corporations, Lipartito contended, had a utopian dimension that was 
traceable to the widespread enthusiasm for voluntary associations "unencumbered 
by tradition." Giant corporations were "meant to find freedom and democracy in a 
hierarchical bureaucracy": "They were to liberate by rationalizing and 
systematizing. It was a project that only true utopians could have imagined" (111). 
Robber Barons Redux: Antimonopoly ReConsidered 13 
1866-had each emboldened insurgent network providers to challenge 
incumbents. It was, thus, not surprising that antimonopoly legislatiqn 
was the expedient favored by the New York Daily Graphic cartoonist 
who in 1875 depicted Western Union's president William Orton, cast 
as the Roman God "Jupiter Ammonopoly," trampling on the goddess 
liberty, a stand-in for the newspaper press. Orton had refused to 
provide equal access to his telegraph network for newsbrokers other 
than the New York Associated Press (NYAP); to remedy this situation, 
the cartoonist urged the enactment of federal legislation empowering 
rival telegraph network providers to compete with Western Union.29 
Gould's 1881 takeover of Western Union prompted large numbers of 
contemporaries to question for the first time the utility of antirnonopoly 
legislation as a regulatory tool. It was not hard to see why. Gould raided 
Western Union on two separate occasions in the 1870s. Each time, 
Gould loudly proclaimed himself an antimonopolist and used existing 
antimonopoly legislation to weaken his rival. Now that Western Union 
had come under Gould's control, everything changed: the country's 
most vociferous antimonopolist had become, at least in the public 
mind, its most rapaciol!-s monopolist. T~s cOn~-sing turn of events 
furnished the theme for an 1881 Harper's Weekly cartoon. "Death to 
Monopoly!" proclaimed a youthful Hercules intent on subduing the 
telegraph ogre with a club labeled "competition.". No longer, however, 
could the cartoonist take-it-for-granted that insurgents would be able 
to challenge the incumbent. To make this point, he paired Hercules 
with an elderly bystander who, as "Uncle Sam," personified the public 
good. "That's right,-my boy," replied Uncle Sam: "That's the way to 
crush him; and if you fail, I'll see what I can do. "30 
Journalistic revulsion toward Gould was a recurrent theme in Puck 
and Judge. In image after image, cartoonists portrayed Gould as a 
machiavellian financier who lined his pockets by stifling trade, 
destroying rival investors, manipulating the press, and corrupting the 
courts. Two masterful cartoons set the tone. Each was the work of 
Puck's most gifted cartoonist, Joseph Keppler, and each was created 
in the months immediately following Gould's takeover of Western 
Union. In the first carto-;;'n, Keppler depicted Gould as a satanic scamp 
comfortably perched on a swing labeled "telegraph monopoly" that 
was held up by telegraph wires that were, quite literally, strangling 
commerce and the press (figure 3). In Gould's back pocket were the 
two powerful New York City newspapers in which he had invested, 
and o"ver which he was widely presumed to exert editorial control, 
29. Theodore Wust, "Jupiter Ammonopoly Orton and his Victim the Press," 
New York Daily Graphic 7 (March 24, 1875): front cover. 
30. T. Bernhard Gillam, "Death to Monopoly!" Harper's Weekly 25 (February 
12, 1881), front cover. 
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Figure 3 Jay Gould's takeover of Western Union in January 1881 outraged 
business leaders and journalists who feared, by no means implausibly, that 
Gould would use his power over the country's electrical communications 
network to manipulate financial m.arkets. In this vividly realized cartoon, Gould 
revels in his newly acquired power~ over commerce and the press. Joseph 
Keppler, "Consolidated," Puck 8 Uanuary 26, 1881 ): centerfold . 
. 
namely, the Tribune and the World. 31 The significance of this detail 
would not have been lost on Puck's media~savvy readers. The Tribune 
and the World were two of the seven New York City newspapers with 
an ownership stake in the NYAP. Should Gould acquire two more 
NYAP newspapers, the nation's largest newsbroker would come 
under his control. 
In the second Keppler fartoon, Gould and his fellow Western 
Union investor William H. Vanderbilt became telegraph linemen 
who, now that they had gained control of Western Union, were intent 
on strangling a hapless Uncle Sam, who was once again a stand-in for 
the public good. The cartoon was. entitled "The Two Philanthropists," 
a sardonic allusion to the presumption that Gould's takeover of 
Western Union might in Borne way benefit someone other than its 
investors (figure 4). "Don't fret, Uncle Sam," Gould and Vanderbilt 
told their helpless victim, as they garroted him with telegraph wire, 
"we only want to make a bigger man of you." Keppler was unconvinced. 
Gould and Vanderbilt's empire, he reminded viewers, now embraced 
31. Joseph Keppler, "Consolidated," Puck 8 (January 26, 1881]: centerfold. "No 
country can be called free"-Puck's editor explained, in commenting on Keppler's 
cartoon-"where it is possible for a private individual to acquire as his own 
personal property all the means of commlUlications among its citizens" (346). 
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Figure 4 For Puck cartoonist Joseph Keppler, Jay Gould and William H. 
Vanderbilt were favorite subjects. In this evocative cartoon1 they were ridiculed 
as phony "philarithropists" determined to use their control over Western 
Union to strangle Uncle Sam. Joseph Keppler, "The Two Philanthropists," Puck 
8 (February 23, 1881 ): centerfold. 
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not only Western Union and many railioads but also tbe tbree NYAP 
newspapers, tbe Tribune, tbe World, and the Express, tbat they had 
wrapped around Uncle Sam's waist. Puck's editor identified tbe 
telegraph pole as a medieval torture rack; a culturally literate viewer 
might well have interpreted it as the cross of tbe crucified Christ. 32 
This was in all likelihood Keppler's intent. Born in Vienna in a 
Catbolic household, Keppler received in his youth a rigorous art 
education that included a !borough study of history painting, giving 
him a familiarity with Catholic religious imagery that would have 
been unusual at this time for a cartoonist born and raised in the 
Protestant United States." 
The magnitude of Gould's pe~fidy furnish&d the theme for an 
ominous cartoon by James A. Wales that ran shortly thereafter in 
fudge. Here Gould is paired not witb Vanderbi!t,.but with Cyrus Field, 
a wealtby merchant who had recently purchased an ownership stake 
in a fourth New York City newspaper, tbe Evening Express. Working 
as saboteurs under cover of moonlight, Gould and Field schemed 
together to disassemble, brick by brick, the "free press lightbouse" 
tbat was guarding the channel of "legitimate p-ade." Each brick bore 
the name of a newspaper: so long as the bricks)\imained in place, the 
press would remain free. Ominously, however, tbe bricks that Gould 
and Field had already dislodged represented four of the seven NYAP 
newspapers: two owned by Gould, namely, the Tribune and the 
World, and two owned by Field, namely, tbe Evening Express and tbe 
Evening Mail. 34 Were the saboteurs not stOpp_ed, the outcome was 
unavoidable: Gould would gain control of the NYAP, tbreatening the 
freedom of the press. "Monopoly," Wales declaimed, in explicating 
his cart_oon, was "fast becoming the octopus of American newspapers." 
To eliminate the danger, it was no longer suffici,ent to enact legislation 
to embolden new entrants to challenge tbe incumbent network 
provider, the traditional antlmonopoly remedy. Instead, lawmakers 
should enact legislation to graft the telegraph onto tbe mail and put 
botb under the control of tbe federal governmpnt: 
The fudge scents danger in a network of wires that can be made to 
obey the mandates of a single owner. Intelligence can be garbled, 
delayed, and refused for the benefit of one man's pocket. Yet, to-day, 
the press of this country is absolutely powerless to check that man's 
will. The telegraph should be part and parcel of mail system, and 
32. Joseph Keppler, "The Two Philanthropists," Puck 8 (February 23, 1881]: 
centerfold. 
33. West, Satire on Stone, chap. 1. 
34. James A. Wales, "The Press in Danger: Monopolists Undermining the 
Peoples Light-House," Judge 1 (December 10, 1881): centerfold. 
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both be under'\he control of Government. The people demand the 
news, and should d.emand the means of its transmission .... We 
can permit no.juggling with the electric girdle of commerce. We 
must feel assured that all is not Gould that glistens in print. 35 
Gould's designs on the NYAP inspired a related cartoon by Puck's 
Frederick B. Opper. How would the New York City newspaper press 
operate, Opper wondered, w~re Gould to prevail? Opper's cartoon 
provided the answer. Gould the newspaper deliveryman sat in the 
back of a horse-drawn ·wagon whose driver held reins made of 
telegraph wires, dictating.the news to the editors of the city's leading 
newspapers, wh~se identities would have been instantly recognizable 
to discerning readers. The only editor to remain aloof was Puck's 
cherubic mascot, who defiantly stood guard at his non-NYAP 
"independent" newsstand, which proudly proclaimed "no 
monopolists need apply. "36 
Even gifted cartoonists soinetimes got things wrong, and, as it 
happens, Wales and Opper were mistaken about Gould. During the 
very same months when they__:alon) with many other journalists, 
business leaders, and public figures-assumed that Gould was poised, 
to take over the NYAP, Gould was in fact secretly maneuvering 
behind-the-scenes to build up NYAP's archrival, the Western 
Associated Press (WAP). Gould's gambit would soon lead to the 
NYAP's collapse and the reorganization of the WAP as the pre~ent day 
AP. 37 None of this, however, was widely known. Gould's machinations 
fooled so many in large part because of the cultura,l context in which 
they occurred. The antimonopoly critique had by the early 1880s 
become so well-known that it seemed almost -inevitable that Gould 
would conspire to gain a stranglehold over the news business by 
virtue of his holdings in Western Union and the New York City 
newspaper press. 
Gould's ability to manipulate the news was so absolute that he had 
no need to speculate, or so implied an 1886 fudge cartoon by Grant E. 
Hamilton (figure 5). The title of Hamilton's cartoon-'"! Never 
Speculate'"-was a quotation from a celebrated public statement of 
Gould's. How, Hamilton asked, could Gould venture such an 
audacious claim? His cartoon provided the answer. Now that Gould 
had gained control of Western Union and the press, he had 
unparalleled access to inside information on market trends, an asset 
35. James A Wales, "Peril of the Press," Judge 1(December10, 1881), 2. 
36. Frederick B. Opper, "When Jay Gould Owns the Associated Press-Puck Will 
Still Keep His Independent News-Stand," Puck 12 (October 4, 1882): back cover. 
37. John, Network Nation, 191-2. 
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Figure 5 William H. Vanderbilt's death in 1885 opened the way for Jay Gould 
to assume the throne as "king of Wall Street," according to judge cartoonist 
Grant E. Hamilton. Gould's throne, appropriately enough, was a telegraph 
stock ticker, upon which Gould contentedly sat, writi[1g-the stock quotations 
himself. Grant E. Hamilton, '"I Never Speculate'-Jay Gould," judge 9 Oanuary 
9, 1886): back cover. 
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that Hamilton ingeniously conveyed by portraying Gould as the "King 
of Wall Street" whose throne was the telegraph ticker (a machine for 
printing out stock prices), upon which Gould sat contently, writing 
the stock prices himself. ' 8 
Cartoonists typically portrayed Gould in human form-whether it 
be a child, <telegraph lineman, newspaper deliveryman, or monarch-
an understandable decision in an age when the individual proprietor 
remained a culture hero.39 Yet not always. Sometimes, for example, 
he was transformed into an animal: a pre~atory whale; a venomous 
python; a mischievous raccoon; or even a poisonous tarantula spider 
whose web, fashioned with telegraph wires, had ensnared the courts.40 
These cartoons underscOred a dimension of Goutd's audacity that 
has often eluded historians and that was the extent to which Gould's 
financial wizardry imperiled the commercial world. For the readers 
of Puck and fudge, Gould was not a Schumpeterian agent of creative 
destruction, but merely 8-n agent of destruction-a "wrecker" as he 
was often called in the pres~. Two cartoons help make this point. The 
first characterized stock trading on Wall Street as a "Cut-Throat 
Business" in which Gould and Vanderbilt had the power, by virtue of 
their inside access to infoTmation on JJ?-arket trends, to slit the throats 
of the many investors foolish engugh to speculate in the shares of 
highly leveraged corporations like Western Union (figure 6).41 In the 
second, New York City's stock exchange became "Hell-Gate," a 
notoriocisly dangerous, stretch of the East River in the city's harbor. 
Looking down at the churning waters was Gould, now the figurehead 
on a harp labeled "speculation" that had been strung with ticker tape 
listing the prices of unusually risky stocks that iucluding Western 
Union. Plucking the harp strings was the siren of speculation, a 
classical temptress, luring unwary investors to their doo1n. To 
reinforce the siren's linkage with Gould, her head was crowned with 
38. Grant E. Hamilton, '"I Never Speculate'-Jay Gould," judge g (January 9, 
1886): back cover. In an editorial accompanying the cartoon, Judge editor James A. 
Wales explained its significance: "When the present King of Wall Street, by lineal 
succession to ,[William H.] Vanderbilt, dec'd, said 'I never speculate,' he told a 
frank and literal truth. He leaves others to speculate on what is to him certainty. He 
is willing they should Jake all the chances and have all the fun and excitement, 
modestly contenting himself with raking in the pot." "The Man in the Ticker," 
judge 9 (January 9, 1886), 2. 
39. Laird, Advertising American Progress, esp. chap. 2. 
40. Joseph Keppler, "The Monster Monopoly," Puck 10 (January 25, 1882): 
centerfold; Frederick Graetz, "The Anaconda at a Loss," Puck 14 (October 31, 
1883), 131; T. Bernhard Gillam, "A New Version of an Old Story," Puck13 (August 
22, 1888): back cover; Frederick B. Opper, "Justice in the Web," Puck 17 (July 22, 
1885): front cover. 
41. Joseph Keppler, "Cut-Throat Business in \'\Tall Street-Hovv the 
Inexperienced Lose Their Heads," Puck 10 (September 7, 1881): centerfold. 
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Figure 6 Few business practices provided more satirical fodder for cartoonists 
at Puck and judge than the ingenuity with which financial insiders like Gould 
and Vanderbilt bamboozled unwary investors. To remind his audience that 
Wall Street was a "cut-,!hroat business<' cartoonist Joseph Keppler portrayed 
Gould and Vanderbilt clS barbers slitting the throats of their naive customers. 
Joseph Keppler, "Cut-Throat Business in. Wall Street-How the Inexperienced 
Lose their Heads," Puck 10 (September 7, 1881 ): centerfold. 
a tiara fashioned out of telegraph poles. The cartoonist's point was 
plain: just as New York City's Hell-Gate imperiled conunerce, so, too, 
did speculation. "Measures Ought to Be Taken at Once," the caption 
urged, in reference to the sharp trading in which speculators like 
Gould engaged, "to Blow up this Obstruction to Legitimate Trade" 
(figure 7).42 Notwithstanding the maghltude of the evil, neither Puck 
nor Judge had much confidence anything would be done. Now that 
Gould the farmer had "bagged" Western Union, or so a Judge cartoon 
from 1885 opined, he would remain in business until the last 
remaining gullible Wall Streetinvestor, or "lamb," had been fleeced.43 
Gould's biographer Maury Klein dismissed the antimonopoly 
critique as the pathetic whining of the losers of a high stakes faro 
game at which Gould excelled.44 Louis Galambos, similarly, has 
42. Frederick Graetz, "The Wall Street Hell-Gate: Matters Ought to Be Taken at 
Once to Blow Up This Obstruction to Legitimate Trade," Puck 15:~(May 14, 1884): 
back cover. ) -
43. D. Mac, '"Jay Gould Is Going to Retire Permanently from Wall Street'-
Daily Paper. Yes; When He Has Finished this Job, and Not Before-The Judge," 
Judge 9 (December 26, 1885): front cover. 
44. Klein, Life and Legend of fay Gould, esp. chap. 23. Oddly, Klein reprinted 
a sheaf of Puck anti-Gould cartoons in his magisterial biography of Gould without 
commenting on them in the text (following 374). 
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Figure 7 The presumption that financial speculation was an impediment to 
commerce was widely shared in the 1880s by merchants, journalists, and 
lawmakers. In this cartoon, the stock exchange is depicted as a rock outcropping 
upon which the sirer:i of speculation lured gullible investors to their ruin. 
Mounted on the siren's harp was a bust of the consummate speculator Jay 
Gould. Frederick Graetz, "The Wall Street Hell-Gate: Measures Ought to Be 
Taken at Once to Blow Up This Obstruction to Legitimate Trade," PUck 15 (May 
14, 1884): back cover. 
22 JOHN 
implied that it demonstrated a lingering, uneasiness with an 
"organizational revolution" that in 1880 had just recently hegun.45 
Neither of these explanations fully explained the cartoonists' concern. 
The cartoonists' n!timate target was neither sharp trading nor giant 
organizations, hut, rather the political economy that emboldened 
speculators like Gould. Gould's ascendancy at Western Union 
demolished the fallacy that antimonopoly legislation could be 
counted on to encourage new entrants· to challenge incumbents. The 
cartoonists' assumed not only that their audience understood this-
had they not it would have been pointless to make Gould's business 
practices an object of satire-but also that it was time to cast the net 
widely for solutions. 
What was to be done? Ever more stringent antimonopoly legislation, 
commission regulation, and government o"Wnership all had their 
champions. For the cartoonists at Puck and Judge, the primary 
alternatives were antimonopoly legislation and government 
ownership. "The Best Remedy" was additional antimonopoly 
legislation, opined James A. Wales in February 1881, one month after 
Gould's takeover of Western Union, in one of the last cartoons he 
drew for Puck before he moved over to Judge. Should Congress charter 
an "anti-monopoly" telegraph company, the "Consolidated Extortion 
Telegraph Company" would be doomed.46 Antimonopoly legislation, 
however, had its own subtle perils, as a ·perceptive Puck cartoon that 
ran eight months later made plain (figure 8). When confronted with 
roads pointing in two directions, one toward "Monopolyville" and 
the other to "Anti-Monopolyville," the magazine's mascot was 
perplexed. The reason was simple. Though the former road led to 
Gould's "Monopoly Telegraph Co.," the latter led to john Kelly's 
Tammany Hall, (New York City's notorious Democratic political 
machine. "Well, I want to be ah anti-monopolist,'' Puck's mascot 
reflected thoughtfully, but not if it led him into Kelly's clutches. 
"Down with the bloated monopolists!!," proclaimed a banner that 
Kelly held aloft, in endorsing new antimonopoly legislation. Kelly, 
however, was in the Puck cartoonist's eyes not being sincere: Kelly 
opposed monopoly not because he objected to morally questionable 
business practices but, ra'ther, because he recognized in -the 
antimonopoly _,groundswell a golden opportunity for political 
45. Galambos, Public Image Of Big Business, esp. chap. 9. Published one year 
before Chandler's Visible Hand, and written in a similar spirit, Galambos's Public 
Image can be read as a social-scientific debunking of the robber baron epithet. 
Galambos's source base consisted mostly of popular magazines, which he analyzed 
using the then-fashionable, yet since largely abandoned-at least among 
historians-method of content analysis. 
46. James A. Wales, "The Best Remedy," Puck B (February 2, 1881): front cover. 
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Figure 8 Gould's takeover of Western Union in_1881 prompted many calls for 
federal legislation to restrain Western Union. The enactment of antimonopoly 
legislation had many supporters, yet, or so this Puck cartoonist warned, its 
legitimate backers were easily co-opted by New York City's notorious political 
machine. 0. K., "Puck's Perplexing Position-Between Two Evils," Puck 10 
(October 12, 1881 ): front cover. 
aggrandizement or even outright graft. Should lawmakers float an 
antimonopoly bill, for example, Kelly hoped to get some of the credit, 
or even a hefty payout from Gould to ensure that it was never enacted. 
Under the circumstances, the enactment of additional antimonopoly 
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legislation might well cause more harm than good. To make this 
point, the cartoonist included a telling detail. Among Kelly's 
unwitting accomplices, or so the cartoonist implied, was the wealthy 
dry goods merchant Francis B. Thurber, who, notwithstanding the 
good intentions of Thurber's recently established "Anti-Monopoly 
Le~gue," was quite literally in Kelly's back pocket. 47 
'Neither Puck nor Judge placed much faith in commission 
regulation, presumably because they feared it would foster corruption. 
With antimonopoly legislation increasingly discredited, this left 
government ownership, a remedy that cartoonists at both magazines 
briefly endorsed.48 Government ownership today is typically regarded 
as the antithesis of antimonopoly. In the 1880s, however, it was often 
its complement. This was particularly true for those contemporaries 
with even a passing familiarity with John Stuart Mill's Principles of 
Political Economy, first published in 1S48. For Mill and his American 
acolytes, government ownership was a logical policy response to 
economic consolidation in a business sector in wbf6h the possibility 
that insurgents might challenge incumbents had for some reason been 
foreclosed. 49 Wales, now at Judge, showed why. "The Best Kind of 
Monopoly," Wales proposed, was a telegraph network owned and 
operated by the Post Office Department as a government agency 
(figure 9). Such a network, Wales predicted, would isolate "wrecker 
monopolists" like Gould behind the rivers of watered stock with 
which they had flooded the market. The caption to Wales's cartoon 
underscored his confidence in government owriership as a remedy for 
the perilous situation that had been occasioned by Gould's 
stranglehold over the means of communication:. "Let the People's 
Government Supply the People's Information/'50 
(' 
47. 0. K., "Puck's P1etplexing Position-Between Two Evils," Puck 10 (October 
12, 1881): front cover. In an accompanying comment, Puck's editor explained the 
rationale for this cartoon: "Mr. Kelly is a champion of the Anti-Monopoly cause 
just as the vendor of 'bu ch u' patent medicines is a benefactor to the human race--
because it pays him .... It has struck him that there was something to be done in a 
'deal' with that pseudo-organization which calls itself the Anti-Monopoly party 
.... If he had been a first-class statesman, he would have seen that the movement 
against the tyranny of misused capital has not yet reached·sufficient proportions to 
make it a tool for even the most skillful of politicians. As things stand, he has only 
weighted b,:is--own party with the responsibility of an issue of, as yet, doubtful 
popularity, and has discredited the good faith of rrumy_ honest and disinterested 
reformers" (82). 
48. Puck 8 (February 2, 1881), 362; James A. Wal8s, "Peril of the Press," fudge 
1(December.10, 1881), 2. 
49. Mill, Principles of Political Economy 2, 540. 
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Figure 9 The "best kind of monopoly," according to Judge cartoonist James A. 
Wales, was a monopoly like the Post Office Department owned and operated 
by the federal government: "Let the People's Government Supply the People's 
Information." James A. Wales, "The Best Kind of Monopoly," judge 2 (October 
71 1882): front coVer. 
The political message of Wales's cartoon challenges present-day 
assumptions regarding big govermnent and big business. Today, it is a 
commonplace to criticize the federal government for incompetence, 
mismanagement, and fraud. Had Wales wished to ridicule the Post 
26 JOHN 
Office Department for its administrative failings, he had no shortage 
of material. The Post Office Department in 1882 was reeling from a 
cascading series of embarrassing disclosures that implicated high-
ranking postal administrators in a.massive contracting scandal, the so-
called "star route" frauds. The star route scandal received wide publicity 
in the press and did not go unremarked in fudge. 51 Interestingly, 
however, neither Wales nor anyone else at either fudge or Puck held it 
up as proof that the Post Office Department was ill-equipped to operate 
the telegraph as well as the mail. From a journalistic standpoint, this 
was unsurprising. Strange as ~t might seem, journalists from across the 
political spectrum regarded the administration of the Post Office 
Department as a public agency as superior to the management of Western 
Union as a private corporation, while a few even praised the Post Office 
Department as more technically advanced.52 Even the oft-voiced 
complaint that the Post Office Department was a sinkbole of party 
patronage was beginning to wear thin: with the recent enactment of civil 
service legislation, it seemed plausible to assume that the promise of a 
nonpartisan civil service was about to be realized. J oumalists 
extravagantly praised the recent establishment by the Post Office 
Department ofa high-speed "Fast Mail" rail link between New York City 
and Chicago, even if, or perhaps more accm;ately, precisely because, it 
obliged postal administrators to jawbone njilroad leaders like William 
H. Vanderbilt to subordinate their private 1interest as investors to the 
needs of postal patrons by adjusting their schedules to speed the mail. 53 
Among the government administrators who coordinated the Fast 
Mail was an ambitious young civil servant named Theodore N. Vail. 
For Vail, the robber baron was more than a mere journalistic abstraction: 
During Vail's tenure in the Post Office Department, he had found 
himself embroiled in a nasty quarrel with Vanderbilt over postal 
scheduling on the New York City-Chicago route that culminated with 
Vanderbilt's audacious decision to throw the mail off his trains. It was 
in response to a journalist who asked Vancjerbilt to explain why he had 
-, flaunted public authority that Vanderbilt snarled "the public be 
damned. "54 It was a lesson Vail never forgot. Many years later, as 
president of the country's dominant telephone network provider Vail 
would invert Vanderbilt's priorities. The telephone corporation Vail 
headed up was American Telephone and Telegraph, the successor to 
51. "The Star Routers' Ascent: Slowly but Surely Approaching Justice," fudge 
1 (March 4, 1882): front cover; "The Do1N11fall of a Great Statesman: Dorsey in the 
Hands of Justice," fudge 1 (April 22, 1882): front cover. 
52. John, Network Nation, 182-3, 
53. Jolm, Network Nation, 214-15. 
54. John, Network Nation, 214-15. 
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American Bell, and, like American Bell, popularly known simply as 
Bell. Instead of regarding his investors' financial return as his highest 
priority, as Vanderbilt had, Vail proclaimed that his primary obligation 
as corporation president was to promote the public good. Vail was by 
no means being purely altruistic. By wrapping himself in the flag, Vail 
shielded Bell from hostilelegislation. Even so, Vail's public stance was 
alien to a Vanderbilt or11 Gould, and underscored the yawning chasm 
that separated the manager-oriented progressive political economy in 
which Vail rose to power from the investor-oriented antirnonopoly 
political economy in which Vanderbilt and Gould had thrived. 
The most serious danger posed by government ownership of the 
telegraph network was not theoretical but practical. Had Congress 
established a government telegraph monopoly, it would have been 
obliged under the National Telegraph Act to buy out the existing 
network providers, including Western Union's largest investor, Jay 
Gould. The dilemma lawinakers confronted was nicely revealed in 
1888 by a Puck carto'on that depicted Gould as a wily raccoon who 
had scrambled up a tree to avoid a potentially unpleasant encounter 
with a gun-wielding Uncle Sam-imaginatively decked out in the 
garb of the iconic frontiersman Davy Crockett (figure 10). Ever 
resourceful, Gould informed the frontiersman that he would happily 
sell Western Union to Congress-which, in fact, was true-should 
Congress pay him $80 million, an exorbitant sUm that was more than 
four times what the best-informed business analysts assumed Western 
Union to be worth. Gould's offer was outrageous, the cartoonist made 
plain, because the value of the assets that Gould had agreed to sell 
had been enormously inflated by Gould himse!f.55 
The heuristic that Gould l\sed to value Western Union's assets 
testified to his ingenuity. Gould based the value of Western Union's 
shares on the :financial return it could generate for its investors, which 
he termed their future earnings power. This future-oriented heuristic 
is commonplace to<l?,y; stocks are presumed to be worth whatever 
investors will pay for them. In, the 1880s, however, it was anathema. 
Gould's overvaluation of Western Union's 'shares, critics charged, 
obliged him to pay out to investors an excessive amount of revenue 
in dividends, making inevitable the overcharging of users, the 
underpayment of workers, and the underinvestment in new technical 
contrivances. Financially innovative, Gould's Western Union was 
technically retrograde, a conclusion reached not only by the 
cartoonists at Puck and Judge but also by journalists familiar with the 
telegraph networks of Great Britain and Germany. 56 
55. T. Bernhard Gillam, "A New Version of an Old Story," Puck 13 (August 22, 
1888): back cover. 
56. John, Network Nation, 182-3. 
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Figure 1 O Opposition to a federal takeover of the telegraph network in the 1880s 
focused less on the relative merits of government administration and corporate 
management than on the financial windfall that a congressional buyout would 
lavish on speculator Jay Gould. In this Puck cartoon, Gould is depicted as a wily 
raccoon poised to outsmart Uncle Sam, who is fitted out as the iconic frontiersman 
Davy Crockett. If Congress wished to purchase Western Union for an outrageous 
sum, Gould informed the frontiersman, he had no objection to the sale. T. Bernhard 
Gillam, "A New Version of an Old Story," Puck 13 (August 22, 1888): back cover. 
Gould's Western Union in the 1880s was in no sense a "natural 
monopoly," as historians often contend, following business historian 
Robert Luther Thompson, who posited that the trend toward 
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monopoly in the telegraph business had become "irresistible" by 
1866.57 Rather, it exploited a loophole in the antimonopoly political 
economy to forestall new entrants by n'egotiating exclusive right-of-
way agreements with the country's leading railroads. Had the courts 
challenged these agreements, Western Union would have been unable 
to maintain its dominant position. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, 
the courts demurred, unwilling to challenge the sanctity of contracts, 
even if, or perhaps because, they safeguarded Western Union's 
prerogatives. 
The antimonopoly critique had different implications in the 
telephone business. Here, too, politics had artifacts:' in the telephone 
business, as in the telegraph business, the business strategy of network 
providers was shaped by the structuring presence of the state. 58 Yet 
the political economy in which telephone c-ompanies operated was 
quite different from the political economy in which Western Union 
had triumphed. Telephone oper!3.ting companies were not chartered, 
as Western Union had been, under antimonopoly laws intended to 
57. Thompson, Wiring a Continent, 440. Thompson inherited from his Ph.D. 
advisor, Allan Nevins, a functionalist view of corporate combines like Western Union. 
In Visible Hand, Chandler echoed Thompson's misleading characteriz8-tion of the 
telegraph giant. So too, in the ~ain, did media scholar James W. Carey in an oft-cited 
essay on "Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph" (Carey, Communication 
as Culture, 155-77). For more on Carey, see John, "Communications Networks." For 
a rare pre-2010 objection to Chandlerian orthodoxy on Western Union, see Du Baff 
and Herman, "Alfred Chandler's New Business History." 
58. Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics"; Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 
4. The idea that the state might in certain circumstances be an independent agent 
of change-as opposed to, say, the instrumentality of a social class-was much 
discussed in the 19~0s by graduate students at I-Iarvard and WT in history, 
sociology, and political Science. At the time, it was widely assumed that society, 
and not the state, was the proper subject of analysis, an assumption shared by 
business historians, social historians, and many historical sociologists. I first 
encountered what we then called state-centered social theory in Theda Skocpol's 
"Bringing the State Back In." Intrigued by Skocpol's research agenda, I presented 
in 1990 a paper based on my dissertation for Skocpol's famed Committee on Social 
and Political Organization. In the following years, I published several essays and 
one edited book that were intended to introduce historians to this theoretical 
tradition. Among these essays were "Governmental Institutions"; "Farewell to the 
'Party Period'"; "Ruling Passions"; and "Telecommunications." "Ruling Passions" 
was the introduction to a collection of original essays that I edited for the Journal 
of Policy 1-h'story, and which was issued shortly thereafter in book form. 
Like myself, Dunlavy was a graduate student in the 1980s, and, like myself, she 
was simultaneously 'influenced by and critical of Chandler. Dunlavy used the 
felicitous phrase "structuring presence" to characterize state structures in her 
influential monograph on comparative nineteenth-century industrialization in the 
United States and Prussia. In the years since, I have tried to keep both the phrase 
and its association with Dunlavy's monograph afloat Dunlavy, Politics and 
Industrialization, 4; John, "Elaborations, Revisions, Dissents," 184; John, 
"Governmental Institutions," 377. 
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discipline incumbents and encourage new entrants. Rather, they were 
muuicipal franchise corporations tightly regulated by city councils: 
entry, rates, and performance standards were determined by political 
fiat rather than market com petition. 
Telephone operating companies in the 1880s were highly 
unpopular with their users,, the vast majority of whom were 
businessmen. High rates and low performance standards were the 
primary grievances: why, users demanded, were investors being 
enriched at their expense? Hostility became especially intense when, 
in 1888, the Supreme Court legitimated the patent rights that the 
patent office had earlier granted to telephone inventor Alexander 
Graham Bell. These pateut rights were owned by American Bell, the 
holding company that licensed exchanges in the nation's major urban 
centers, including New York City. User dlscontent was dramatized in 
a hard-hitting cartoon 1888 by judge cartc5onist Grant E. Hamilton in 
which Hamilton depicted American Bell as a rapacious spider that 
has trapped in its web not only the federal government but also its 
users: brokers, bankers, and druggists. How did American Bell 
prevail? Not through superior management, but, rather, though a 
variety of dubious strategems that included, as the spider's tentacles 
proclaimed, "treachery," "corruption," and "undue influence. "59 
No Puck or judge cartoonist in the 1880s championed open entry 
for. new telephone operating companies as a remedy for high rates, 
low performance standards, and overly generous dividend payments. 
If anything, they regarded competition as a' menace. Consider, for 
example, the response of judge cartoon,ists to the proliferation of 
overhead wires that had been hastened by the rapid expansion of the 
telephone business in New York City. Early in the decade, cartoonists 
struck a light-hearted note. In one cartoon, for example, overhead 
wires helped a peddler display his wares and an apartment dweller 
dry her laundry. 60 In another, a futuristic fantasy set "five hundred 
years hence," overhead wires strung by telephone and telegraph 
companies looped ov'ei the outstretched arm of the Statue of Liberty. ' 1 
When it became widely known that the entanglement of low-voltage 
telephone and telegraph wires with high-voltage electric power wires 
threatened passersby with elect:r;ocution, the tone changed. Some 
cartoonists played this potentially lethal hazard for laughs. In one 
59. Grant E. Hamilton, "In the Clu~ch of a Grasping Monopoly," Judge 14 (April 
7, 1888): back cover. 
60. Eugene Zimmerman, "High Tiine Something Was Done About It," fudge 10 
(August 14, 1886): back cover. 
61. Grant E. Hamilton, "A Peep into the Future," fudge 11 [October 30, 1886): 
back cover. 
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whimsical cartoon, street gqers, their horses, and even their dogs 
protected themselves against electrocution by donning Judge's 
patented "Non-Conductor Rubber Suits,"62 For others, the situation 
had become tragic. In one arresting cartoon inspired by an actual 
news story, the supposedly. beneficent electric light bulb had been 
transmogrified into a skull that hovered ominously over the dangling 
corpse of a telegraph lineman whose electrocuted body had become 
enmeshed in overhead wires. 63 
Competition briefly flourished in the telephone business for a few 
years in the 1890s and 1900s following the expiration of the second 
of Alexander Graham Bell's patents in 1894. Even here, however, the 
business strategy of telephone operating companies remained 
constrained by the political economy of the municipal franchise 
corporation. In the telephone business, competition was always 
contrived. The exception that proved the rule was the 1913 settlement 
that the federal justice department brokered with Bell and its rivals to \ 
forestall the prosecution of Bell under the Sherman Act for restraining 
trade. With this settlement, according to one wit, the "telephone 
trust" had been "discClpnected. "64 The reality was more complicated. 
The settlement was in no sense a victory for competition: no lawmaker 
seriously proposed the. enactment of legislation to encourage new 
entrants to contest the market. Instead, lawmakers segmented the 
market to facilitate its orderly regulation. In return for certain 
concessions, the existing network providers-that is, Bell and its 
non~Bell, or "independent," rivals-were guaranteed a steady 
financial return. This ruling shielded Bell from legal assault, a 
nontrivial benefit in a highly uncertain political environment. More 
importantly, it was a godsend for the independents, since it assured 
wary investors that the independents would, in fact, survive, and, 
thus, that they could prudently loan !hem the capital that many 
desperately needed to remain afloat. 
Bell would remain the dominant telephone network provider in 
the United States from 1913 until the court-ordered breakup of the 
Bell System in 1984. Under the leadership of President Theodore N. 
Vail, who had not forgotten his earlier quarrel with William H. 
Vanderbilt, Bell came to justify its dominant position by ostentatiously 
proclaiming the subordination of merely economic considerations-
including, in particular, th·e maximization of its investors' financial 
return-to loftier goals such as technical innovation and the 
62. Grant E. Hamilton, "Discovered! Judge's Appliance for the Prevention of 
Accidents by Electric Wires," Judge 17 (December 21, 1889), 186. 
63. "An Unrestrained Demon," Judge 17 (October 26, 1889): front cover. 
64. "Disconnected, B'Gosh!" Portland Oregon Journal, July 26, 1913. 
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provisioning of low-cost local telephone service to the entire 
population. The capitalization of Bell securities, Vail decreed, was to 
be based not on future earning power, but on sunk costs-with no 
allowance for franchise values or good will. In so doing, Vail rejected 
the future-oriented financial heuristic that Gould had pioneered. 
Henceforth, Bell combined financial orthodoxy with technical 
virtuosity, a business strategy aptly symbolized by the completion in 
1915 of its money losing, but reputation enhancing, transcontinental 
telephone hookup, an achievement made possible by the first 
commercial application of the high-vacuum tube, an innovation that 
historians of science credit with marking the advent of electronics. To 
burnish Bell's image for technical virtuosity, corporate publicists 
touted the transcontinental telephone line as a "Triumph of Science," 
an ostensibly apolitical ideal that concealed Bell's indebtedness to 
the political economy in which it flourished and for which its business 
strategy had been de~igned. 65 
To characterize the 1880s as a "gilded" age is misleading. In few 
decades was public revulsion at financial speculation more pointed. 66 
The "gilded age" catch phrase was almostneverused by contemporaries 
to characterize the epoch and would not be popularized until after 
the First World War; to this day, it remains the only commonly 
accepted_periodizing device in US historiography that is explicitly 
pejorative. Even so, the years between 1900 and 1917 can be properly 
called progressive. This epoch witnessed the chastening of investor-
dominated combines like Gould's Western Union and the ascendancy 
of technically oriented, public-relat/ons savvy, management-led 
corporations like Vail's Bell. ' · 
The revulsion against financial speculation so vividly portrayed in 
Puck and judge in the 1880s became a hallmark not only of the 
managerial corporation but also of the "organizational synthesis" of 
American business history that Louis Galarnbos popularized in his 
pioneering attempt to integrate into American historiography the 
"managerial revolution" that Chandler had documented in several 
influential essays, as well as in Strategy and Structure (1962) and The 
Visible Hand (1977). 67 
One oft-overlooked feature 'of both Strategy and Structure and 
Visible Hand was their anti-investor bias. For Chandler, managers-
dominated center stage, while bankers, brokers, and speculators 
65. John, Network Nation, chap. 1L 
66. John, "Who Were the Gilders?" 
67. Galambos, "Organizational Synthesis"; Galambos, "Technology, Political 
Economy, and Professiori.alization." 1 
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remained in the wings. The anti-investor bias of the corporate manager 
was for Chandler a family tradition. Chandler's great-grandfather was 
the business journalist Henry Varnum Poor, editor of the American 
Railroad Journal and the Poor of the Standard and Poor credit rating 
ag~ncy. For Chandler, his ancestor's abhorrence toward speculative 
finance was more than a dimly remembered memory. Poor's business 
career had been the subject of Chandler's 1952 PhD dissertation, and, as 
Chandler documented in the book that grew out of this dissertation, Poor 
had vociferously denounced stock ·watering as early as 1854. From that 
year onward, Chandler observed, Poor "continued to deplore the heavy 
tax placed on American trade by the ever-growing amount of water in 
American railroad stocks."63 There is no evidence that Poor himself ever 
denounced railroad leaders as "robber barons" in the American Railroad 
Journal or anywhere else. Yet if he had, it would have been entirely 
consistent with his pointed indictment of speculative finance. , 
1 
The visual iconography of antimonopoly that Puck and }udge 
cartoonists popularized in the 1880s would long remain a resource 
for critics of corporate excess. Its legacy was particularly evident in 
the progressive era, a period in which moral indignation toward giant ' 
corporations helped inspire the investigative reporting that is today 
known as muckraking. Continuities abound. For example, the 
imperious business magnate that in 1890 a Puck cartoonist had 
derided as "King Monopoly" would reappear eleven years later in a 
Puck caricature ofjohn D. Rockefeller. 69 The magnate's iconographic 
descendent lives on today in vestigial form as "Rich Uncle Pennybags," 
a trademark of the popular board game "Monopoly," itself an heir of 
the antimonopoly critique of private land ownership that had been 
popularized by the late-nineteenth-century activist Henry George.70 
A Judge cartoonist rendered Standard Oil an octopus as early as 1884, 
a conceit that a Puck cartoonist would re-Vive in 1904.71 The visual 
iconographywith which Keppler savaged dubious drugmanµfacturers 
as a patent medicine "trust" in Puck in 1881 would, similarly, find 
echoes in a Collier's cartoon in 1905. Each depicted the patent 
medicine business as a menacing skull whose rotting teeth had been 
fashioned out of the death-dealing bottles that it purveyed. 72 A second 
68. Chandler, Poor, 136; John, "Turner, Beard, Chandler," 234-5. 
69. Louis Dalryn1ple, "And He Asks for More!" Puck 27 (May 7, 1890): 
centerfold; Jolin S. Pughe, '~The King of the Combinations," Puck 49 (February 27, 
1901): centerfold. -
70. Orbanes, Monopoly, chap. 1. 
71. Frank Beard, "A Giant Monopoly," Judge 6 Quly 19, 1884): centerfold; Udo 
J. Keppler, "Next!" Puck 56 (September 7, 1904): centerfold. 
72. Joseph Keppler, "Death's Head-Doctors-Many-Paths to the Grave," Puck 9 
(April 3, 1881): centerfold;,E. VV. Kemble, "Death's Laboratory," ColHer's 34 Qune 
1905):-front cover. 
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biting Keppler cartoon from 1881, "Bosses of the Senate," anticipated 
several of the key themes that journalist David Graharu Phillips would 
explore over two decades later in his landmark 1906 muckraking 
expose, "The Treason of the Senate. "73 
The presumption that big business posed a greater menace to the 
republic than big govermnent would remain, at least aruong 
cartoonists, conventional until the First World War. Only then would 
it become common for cartoonists to identify the monster octopus 
with the state and not the corporation, as would one New York Herald 
cartoonist in 1919, in opposing the proposed congressional buyout of 
the telegraph, telephone, railroad, and cable.74 
The economic legacy of the antimonopoly critique is harder to 
assess, but even more consequential. Antimonopoly legislation could 
foster innovation. The entrepreneurial hothouse in the telegraph 
business that antimonopoly legislation had spawned in the 1870s 
spurred the invention of three of the most fundamental innovations 
of the age: namely, the telephone, the phonograph, and the electric 
power station. And in no sense was this legacy confined to the distant 
past. Institutionalized at the federal and state level though a welter of 
laws and regulations that included, but were by no means confined 
to, state and federal antitrust statutes, antimonopoly remains today a 
pillar of the American political economy. The Japanese economic 
miracle owed something to the imposition of antitrust laws by the 
United States following Japan's defeat in the Second World War; 
analogous legislation helped spur Europe's postwar economic 
revival. 75 In the realm of intellectual property, the antimonopoly 
critique remains influential in domains as diverse as patents, 
copyright, and trademarks; in addition, it continues to provide a 
compelling rationale for the legally mandated market segmentation of 
several business sectors, including communications. 
It is always risky for a historian to predict the future. Yet it would 
not be surprising, given the egregious financial abuses of the recent 
past, if we were to witness in the coming years a revival of the 
antimonopoly critique that had been in the 1880s such a prominent 
feature of public discourse. Contrary to a common assumption, at 
least among historians, this critique did not take as its target the so-
called "organizational revolution," while it owed its inspiration 
73. Joseph Keppler, "The Bosses of the Senate," Puck 24 Uanuary 23, 1889): 
centerfold. 
74. "Is This What We Fought For?" New York Herald [1919}, reprinted in 
Review of Reviews 59 [February 1919), 138. 
75. Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism; Wells, Antitrust and the Formation 
of the Postwar World; Berk, Brandeis. 
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neither to hidebound reactionaries nor to impractical visionaries. 
Rather, it drew its principal inspiration from the time-honored, and 
often well-founded, objections of merchants, lawmakers, and the 
journalists who championed their cause-including the cartoonists at 
Puck and fudge-to a political economy in which they could plausibly 
contend that business leaders lackedaccountability, giant corporations 
favored the private interests of financial insiders over the public 
good, and speculation clogged the channels of trade. 
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